The All New Myanmar By Dr. Amit Singh

NMF Commentary

January 04, 2012

Varuna Complex, Airport Road,
NH - 8, New Delhi - 110010
Tel: +91-11-26154901
Tele fax: +91-11-26156520

Website:  www.maritimeindia.org

Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on January 04, 2012

Myanmar is going through an unprecedented political and socio-cultural transformation. During the past five decades of military-rule, the country witnessed suppression of democratic norms/institutions, human rights violations, armed insurgencies by the sidelined ethnic minorities, detention of the opposition activists and leaders, especially the Nobel Peace laureate Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the economic policies enforced by the junta left most of the common people impoverished.

The winds of change in Myanmar started soon after the November 2010 General Elections, which ended the decades-old era of military-rule in the country. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) were declared victorious. However, the international community and United Nations (UN) expressed doubts over the credibility of the election-results and termed it as a ‘sham’. In fact, some of the clauses in the 2008 constitution or the third constitution of Myanmar, promulgated by the junta before the elections, barred ASSK, the country’s prominent pro-democratic face, from contesting the elections. Consequently, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted the elections saying electoral laws were ‘unfair’.

Truth to tell, no one expected any reforms under the new ‘civilian’ Government. But the former military rulers surprised their critics by introducing political changes that were unthinkable just a few months ago. Thein Sein, the newly elected President has advocated a reformist-agenda, and has reached out to ASSK (she has been agitating for democracy in Myanmar since more than 20 years and spent almost last 15 years under house arrest). He has gone ahead and established the National Human Rights Commission, implemented of a new labour law in consultation with the International Labour Organisation, relaxed restriction on the media, allowed some economic liberalisation and release of hundreds of political prisoners. Although, the reasons behind this sudden shift remain unclear, but observers believe the Government introduced political reform has been driven by a need to mobilise support for Myanmar’s bid for the 2014 ASEAN Chairmanship.

The recent reforms that include amendments in electoral laws have encouraged ASSK and her party NLD to contest the upcoming by-elections, for nearly 48 vacant seats in the Parliament, to be held in early 2012 (March/April-though no date has yet been announced). To facilitate NLD’s return to the mainstream politics, the Election Commission of Myanmar has already approved its application to officially re-register as a political party and also pledged to hold free and fair by-elections.

The United States and Myanmar

The democratisation process in Myanmar also resulted in the historic three-day visit of the US’ Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton from November 30-December 2, 2011. She was the first US Foreign Policy Chief to visit Myanmar in more than half a century since the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles visited the country in 1955.

During her visit, Clinton notably met Myanmar's President Thein Sein and praised the pro-democratic reforms initiated by the new government and urged Naypyidaw to take further steps towards national reconciliation by releasing remaining political prisoners and end ethnic conflicts. She also reminded that the better ties would be impossible unless Myanmar break-off its military ties and suspected nuclear links with North Korea. She told Thein Sein that the US will support more aid for Myanmar and consider re-establishing ambassador-level contact with Naypyidaw, after a lull of two decades, and would also consider easing sanctions if the government shows genuine reforms progress. Balancing both the ruling and the opposition party, Clinton also met ASSK in Yangon.

The US is now appears to be recalibrating its policy vis-à-vis Myanmar as over the time, Washington has realized that the policy of imposing economic sanctions proved counter-productive and rather it motivated Naypyidaw to seek closer ties with Beijing. The maritime manoeuvre of the PLA Navy in the South China Sea also encouraged US to shift its policy framework from West Asia to Indo-Pacific, where most countries are concerned about the growing Chinese assertiveness. Therefore, to balance China in the region, the US is strengthening its alliances and if Myanmar could be made to realign more towards the West, it would be a major game-changer in the region.

India and Myanmar

India’s contacts with Myanmar go back to the pre-Christian era. Myanmar also came under the spell of Indian cultural influence, as Buddhism spread directly from India and indirectly through Ceylon, profoundly influencing all spheres of Burmese life. A large population of Indian origin (according to the 2001 report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, the total number of ethnic Indians in Myanmar is estimated to be around 2.9 million) lives in Myanmar without having any political rights or recognition.

India and Myanmar are jointly working on several projects both in infrastructural and non-infrastructural areas, including up-gradation and resurfacing of the 160 km-long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road, construction and up-gradation of the Rhi-Tiddim Road in Myanmar, the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project. The bilateral trade between both countries increased significantly from US$ 12.4 million in 1980-81 to US$ 1207.56 million in 2009-10. New Delhi and Naypyidaw are also engaged with each other on regional and sub-regional context through Mekong-Ganga Co-operation, ASEAN and BIMSTEC. In August 2008, Myanmar was given the observer status in the SAARC with India’s help and now Myanmar is eyeing SAARC’s permanent membership as the country is geographically a part of extended South Asia region.

Myanmar’s bid for the entry into SAARC has not been seen differently as India and Myanmar share a long land border of over 1600 km and a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar is the largest country touching India’s eastern border and acts as a buffer state between India’s North-eastern region and the Chinese provinces. Myanmar is extremely rich in natural resources, notably oil and gas. Therefore, cordial relations with Myanmar can facilitate India’s energy requirements.

Moreover, Myanmar’s Navy is operating in the Bay of Bengal and India does not want hostile relations with this neighbour, as Naypyidaw shares good relations with Beijing. Chinese Navy is already looking for a strong base in the Bay of Bengal and if Myanmar ‘allows’ Chinese naval forces to have access to the Bay of Bengal, it would be a major threat for India’s security. For maintaining peace in the North-Eastern region, it is in India’s internal security interest to keep the momentum going in the right direction with Myanmar. Most of the insurgent groups active in North-Eastern states of India are using the bordering areas of Myanmar as a safe haven. In fact, on December 3, 2011, there were reports that the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA’s) top leader Lt. Col. Jibon Moran was arrested in Myanmar along with an Indian journalist.

The newly elected President of Myanmar Thein Sein paid a State visit to India on October 12-15, 2011. During the visit India congratulated Myanmar on their transition towards democracy and offered all necessary assistance in further strengthening this transition, in an inclusive and broad based manner. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Myanmar reiterated their shared commitment to strengthening and broadening the multifaceted relationship based on shared history, civilisational ties and close religious, linguistic and cultural affinities, and to take it to a new level.

Conclusion

The continuing democratic reforms in Naypyidaw can be seen as “a new Avatar” of Myanmar, which could have a positive bearing on the entire region. The President ordered ceasefire in Kachin State in December 2011 and the recently signed deal with the southern Shan state is a major step forward. There is speculation that almost all political prisoners in Myanmar will be given amnesty by the end of February 2012. This could be an overt way of meeting international community’s demand, as Hillary Clinton said on a recent visit to Myanmar that Washington wants to see an end to decades of fighting with rebel groups before it normalises relations with Naypyidaw.

After Ms Clinton’s successful visit, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague is scheduled to visit Myanmar in early January 2012 to continue constructive engagement with its government leaders. India too is sending its Army Chief General VK Singh on a five-day visit to Naypyidaw starting from January 05, 2012, to discuss matters related to the internal security.

Like every other nation in this time and age, the future of Myanmar lies in democracy and the transition will be possible if the present government peacefully resolves their decades-old ethnic issues. The Myanmar’s authorities could consider favourably the demands of revising the 2008 constitution since the ethnic groups find no space for themselves in new constitution. Decentralising the power or adopting the federal structure may help in accommodating all the stakeholders in Myanmar. However, the authorities have their own scepticism over federalism and fear that Myanmar would disintegrate under federalism. Here, New Delhi can help Naypyidaw by sharing their own experiences on the decentralisation of powers.

On January 02, 2012, the Chief Secretary of Manipur announced the long-awaited luxury bus service between Imphal and Mandalay, to be launched by March 2012, which will be the first proper link between India and Myanmar. This connectivity holds the potential to integrate India’s North-Eastern region with the broader ASEAN’s inter-connectivity effort in future, with consequential benefits for both, India and Myanmar. This is, therefore, an opportune time for India to substantially, rather than symbolically, recalibrate its foreign policy towards Myanmar. This recalibration can pay rich dividends to its ongoing Look-East Policy.

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South China Sea Dispute and India

25 September 2011

Amit Singh*                                                                          

Research Associate, 

National Maritime Foundation, 

New Delhi

Published by The SAEA Group, Singapore on September 25. 2011

Shared by The National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi and Voice of India

Conflicting claims over islands and maritime zones in the South China Sea (SCS) has been a longstanding security issue between China, Taiwan and five Southeast Asian countries. The recent uptick in tensions in the SCS underscores the volatile nature of the problem, only conforming fears that it is a major “regional security flashpoint” with global consequences.

In a submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) in May 2009, Beijing claimed the entire SCS and made its first effort to include the region as a "core national interest", similar to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang province. In response, the US rejects the China's claims to sovereignty over the entire SCS emphasizing that the American national interest is served by the freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the SCS.

China’s hard line on the SCS has affected India too. New Delhi was a bit taken aback after Beijing denounced plans by an Indian Company to develop oil fields in the region. The Chinese objection was to ONGC Videsh’s (OVL) venture for off-shore oil exploration in water’s belonging to Vietnam (not recognized by China), Beijing urged India to refrain from entering into deals with Vietnamese firms exploring oil and gas in the disputed SCS over which China enjoys ‘indisputable’ sovereignty.

However, while China opposes India’s entry into the SCS, it insists on building strategic projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) and on deploying troops there. There were recently unconfirmed reports of confrontation between the Chinese warship and INS Airavat in the international waters of SCS. India has responded to Chinese objections by stating that its cooperation with Vietnam is in accordance with international laws. During SM Krishna’s visit to Hanoi on September 15-17, 2011, the External Affairs Minister of India underlined that OVL will go ahead with oil and gas exploration in the two offshore blocks (127 and 128) claimed by Vietnam. China, however, appeared unconvinced and announced plans to expand maritime exploration of 10,000 sq km of seabed in Southwest Indian Ocean.

The afore-stated developments need to be seen in the context of India’s stated naval doctrine. The Indian Navy document (2007) “Freedom to use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy”, lays down clearly that India's area of interest which “extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea''. In the 2010 ARF meeting, India was among 12 (of 27 participating countries) that backed the United States’ multilateral approach, instead of China’s “bilateral approach” for resolution of the SCS disputes. During the 17th ARF meeting, India joined other countries to openly declare that the SCS should remain open for international navigation. The Indian position on the security situation in the SCS was made clear by the Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in her address at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on July 28, 2011, where she reiterated the region’s importance as an important shipping route and India support for freedom of navigation in sea-lanes.

India’s Interests in the SCS

India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the SCS. The SCS is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55% of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the SCS. Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to Mangalore through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region. If China continues to assert dominance over these waters, it will be difficult for India to continue with its activities through this channel.

India-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation

Maritime cooperation between India and ASEAN has been sparse and limited. Although Indian naval ships frequently visit the Southeast Asian countries ports and SCS, cooperation with regard to capacity-building and patrolling piracy-infested areas or jointly facing non-traditional threats at sea like drug-trafficking, human-trafficking and possible maritime terrorism remain inadequate.

India however, in recent years, has been seen as a credible counterweight to China. Southeast Asian countries, wary of continued Chinese aggression in the SCS, have encouraged joint maritime exercises with India. In February 2010, the Indian Navy concluded its Milan series of maritime exercises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and almost all ASEAN countries participated in Milan exercise.

India, which has helped Malaysia in building up its Coast Guard in the past, must consider assisting other ASEAN countries. India has a strong Navy with technological credibility that can be leveraged by ASEAN. Collaboration on missile technology, radar systems, defence component systems and supporting hardware are again areas where ASEAN countries can work in partnership with India. China, naturally, does not welcome the ASEAN move to interact militarily with India.

India has also shown keenness to sell Brahmos missiles to friendly countries including the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Most of the ASEAN countries have been engaged in a defence modernization programme and would like to obtain assistance in weapons up-gradation and systems integration. Like India, most of the Southeast Asian countries also rely on Russia for their defence procurements. India with its long experience in using Russian products and developed the technological capabilities for low cost servicing could be a potential ally for ASEAN in this field. Assisting ASEAN will also improve India’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries bilaterally and multilaterally and it will also boost India’s morale in balancing China in the IOR.

Conclusion

China’s recent acts in the SCS indicate that it is working on a ‘revisionist agenda’ in the region and trying to unilaterally change the status quo in the SCS. China’s rising economic and military might could compel the ASEAN countries to rally together as well as to seek assistance from the United States’ and other nations to balance China.

The US posture has, in turn, raised tensions in the region as China warned its neighbours not to “play with fire”. Further, Beijing believes that Washington is eyeing to control the Spratlys through Vietnam and the Philippines. If the territorial disputes relating to the SCS are not resolved soon to the satisfaction of all maritime stake holders including the littoral nations, a heightened global tension might result.

On India’s part, if New Delhi is concerned about the freedom of navigation in the SCS. It is only too aware that this is an issue that will profoundly impact Indian foreign policy. New Delhi realizes, now more than ever, that capacity building and maritime cooperation between India and ASEAN will be the key to stability in the region. However, the question arises, how will India sustain its position in the SCS, either through OVL or by backing Vietnam but this will require the political will and strategic vision.

*The views of the author(s) are their own, and do not in any way reflect or represent the opinions of SAEA GROUP, Singapore.

© Copyright 2011, Southeast Asia Research Programme by IPCS-SAEA GROUP

South China Sea Dispute: A New Area of Global Tension by Dr. Amit Singh

NMF Commentary

July 20, 2011

Varuna Complex, Airport Road,
NH - 8, New Delhi - 110010
Tel: +91-11-26154901
Tele fax: +91-11-26156520

Website:  www.maritimeindia.org

Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on July 20, 2011

Territorial disputes between China and several Southeast Asian countries, over islands in the South China Sea (SCS) have been going on for decades. However, with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) setting a deadline for submitting claims for extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles, the issue has turned into a new area of global tension. After Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their respective claims, China made a submission to the UN in May 2009 and claimed that it had “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” Beijing also included the SCS in its "core national interests" and in the non-negotiable territorial claims category—the same phrase it uses for Taiwan, Tibet and Xinxiang.

In response, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rejected China's claims to sovereignty over the 1.3 million square-mile sea at the 17^th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 at Hanoi. She stated that “the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea”, and reiterated the importance of “opposing the use of force or any coercion by any claimant.” Further, she called for a binding “regional code of conduct” in the South China Sea—a move that would undercut China’s attempts to assert its claims in a region that Beijing regards as “strategically sensitive”.

In the recent years, China has been growing increasingly assertive in pressing its claims over SCS matters. But the other nations in the region do not acquiesce to China’s claims. In fact, during the 2010 ARF meeting, it was reported that 12 of the 27 participating countries had backed the United States’ multilateral approach instead of China’s bilateral approach for resolution of the SCS disputes.

Claimants of the South China Sea

China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are the claimants of maritime zones in the SCS. In the South China Sea there are more than 200 tiny islands and several uninhabited rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs; majority of them located in the Paracel and Spratly Island chains. The Spratly and Paracel islands are the major flashpoints of overlapping territorial disputes within the South China Sea.

Table: Territorial claims relating to Paracel and Spratly Island Group

Country	Claims
China	Refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha islands, and claims all the islands and most of the South China Sea for historical reasons. These claims are not marked by coordinates or otherwise clearly defined. China also claims the Paracel Islands (referred to as the Xisha Islands), and includes them as part of its Hainan Island province.              Chinese claims are based on a number of historical events, including the naval expeditions to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming Dynasty from 1403-1433 AD. Chinese fishermen and merchants have worked in the region over time, and China is using archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of sovereignty.                In the 19th and early 20th centuries, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands. During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region. In 1974, China seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam.
Taiwan	Taiwan's claims are similar to those of China, and are based upon the same principles. As with China, Taiwan's claims are also not clearly defined. Occupies Pratas Island in the Spratlys.
Vietnam	Vietnamese claims are based on history and the continental shelf principle. Vietnam claims the entire Spratly Islands (Truong Sa in Vietnamese) as an offshore district of the province of Khanh Hoa. Vietnamese claims also cover an extensive area of the South China Sea, although they are not clearly defined. In addition, Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands (the Hoang Sa in Vietnamese), although they were seized by the Chinese in 1974.                The Vietnamese have followed the Chinese example of using archaeological evidence to bolster sovereignty claims.
Philippines	Its Spratly claims have clearly defined coordinates, based both upon the proximity principle as well as on the explorations of a Philippine explorer in 1956. In 1971, the Philippines officially claimed 8 islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan, partly on the basis of this exploration, arguing that the islands: 1) were not part of the Spratly Islands; and 2) had not belonged to anyone and were open to being claimed. In 1972, they were designated as part of Palawan Province, and have been occupied.
Malaysia	Its Spratly claims are based on the continental shelf principle, and have clearly defined coordinates. Malaysia has occupied 3 islands that it considers to be within its continental shelf. Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil from the mainland and has built a hotel.
Brunei	Does not occupy any of the islands, but claims part of the South China Sea nearest to it as a part of its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. Therefore, in 1984, Brunei declared its EEZ which included Louisa Reef.
Indonesia	Not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands. However, Chinese and Taiwanese claims in the South China Sea extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, including Indonesia's Natuna gas field.

Source: www.southchinasea.org

Map: South China Sea

Beijing claims almost the entire SCS, citing ‘historical’ records which purportedly show Chinese control in the region over the past two millennia. Taiwan’s claims are similar to those of China as the island considers itself to be the Republic of China. Indonesia is also a party to the dispute but they are seeking only maritime rights without claiming any islands of the region. In fact Indonesia’s EEZ and continental shelf overlap China’s claims, which include Indonesia’s largest natural gas reserves. Vietnam rejects China’s historical explanation and asserts that Beijing had never claimed sovereignty over the islands till the 1940s. Hanoi is convinced that both Spratly and Paracels are entirely within its own territory and has the documents to prove that the islands have been ruled by Vietnam since the 17th century.

Strategic and Economic Importance of the South China Sea

The main reason behind the scramble for the two island chains is its richness in natural resources, especially oil and gas. On April 19, 2011 China’s Global Times published a special report that termed the region as the “Second Persian Gulf” – a repository of 50 billion tons of crude oil and more than 20 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (about twenty five times China’s proven oil reserves and eight times its gas reserves).

The SCS is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Eighty per cent of China’s energy imports and Japan and Koreas oil supplies pass through these waters. Almost, fifty five per cent of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the SCS to China, Japan, Korea and the United States. The economic potential and geopolitical importance of the SCS are the primary motivating factors for the surrounding countries to claim the islands and their resources. The bountiful fishing opportunities within the region are yet another motivating factor for the overlapping territorial claims in the SCS.

Recent Upsurge in Tension

In the past few years, aggressive maneuvers of the PLA maritime agencies in the SCS have resulted in the ASEAN countries adopting a more robust defense policy. Vietnam is in the process of acquiring six Russian Kilo-class submarines and a dozen Su-30MKK jet fighters equipped for maritime warfare. Malaysia has also paid more than $1 billion for two diesel submarines from France. Indonesia too announced that it will acquire new submarines. Considering the strategic importance of the SCS, Australia has expressed willingness to buy or build nine more submarines and bolster its air force with 100 US-built F-35s.

As China seeks to intimidate her rivals into stopping oil exploration and mining in the area, other nations in turn have begun to protest vehemently against Beijing’s military build-up in the region. Recently, Vietnam blamed China for deliberately sabotaging two Vietnamese exploration operations which led to the huge anti-China protests in Hanoi. Consequently, Hanoi held live-fire exercises off its coast, an act described by China as a grave provocation.

These skirmishes run counter to the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (2002) in the SCS, drawn up between the ASEAN countries and the People’s Republic of China. Under the agreement, the countries had agreed to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations”. But recent developments have negated the ‘friendly tenor’ that underpinned the agreed mechanism for conflict resolution.

There is also news that China is planning to deploy her first aircraft carrier in the SCS on a trials basis. Beijing seems to believe that deploying the aircraft carrier will act as a deterrent to keep away the other nations eyeing the region. Beijing’s showing off tactics or deploying aircraft carrier close to the SCS can only add to the tensions and arms race in the region.

Conclusion

China’s recent acts in the SCS indicate that they are working on a ‘revisionist agenda’ in the region and trying to unilaterally change the status quo in the SCS. China’s rising economic and military might could compel the ASEAN countries to rally together as well as to seek assistance from the United States’ to balance China. As Beijing seeks to neutralize US presence in the region, the US appears to have become more assertive and keen to play a crucial role in the SCS dispute. In fact, the US has increased its maritime cooperation with regional countries, mainly concentrating on capacity-building with Vietnam and the Philippines. The US and the Philippines Navies held joint exercises in the SCS from June 28 to July 8, 2011. In an another move, the United States, Australia and Japan reportedly held a trilateral military exercise off the coast of Brunei in the SCS on July 9, 2011. These naval exercises do indicate the continuing US strategic stake in the region. In a joint press conference with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen on July 11, 2011 at Beijing, the China’s Chief of the General Staff, General Chen Bingde underscored that the joint military exercises held by US in the SCS with Vietnam and Philippines were “extremely inappropriate” and Washington should respect Beijing's core interests. On the contrary, Mike Mullen reiterated that the US would continue to support its allies in the region.

The US posture has, in turn, raised tensions in the region as China warned its neighbours not to “play with fire”. Further, Beijing believes that Washington is eyeing to control the Spratlys through Vietnam and the Philippines. If the territorial disputes relating to the SCS are not resolved soon to the satisfaction of all maritime stake holders including the littoral nations, heightened global tension might result. The forthcoming 18th ARF meeting to be held in Bali, Indonesia on 23 July 2011 could provide a useful opportunity to tone down the rhetoric and explore ways of reducing tensions in the SCS.

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Aman ki Asha by Dr. Amit Singh

With the experience of dealing with Pakistan in the past, most people in India end up concluding (rather philosophically) that relations between the two neighbours can best be described as ‘Kabhi Khushi-Kabhi Gum’. That is perhaps a generous assessment, for what appears more appropriate is the phrase: Thodi Khushi-Kaafi Gum!

The recent visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary Ms. Nirupama Rao and Home Minister P. Chidambaram to Pakistan to meet their counterparts at the end of June 2010 was the first Ministerial level visit from the Indian side since 26/11. Not surprisingly, it turned out to be another ritualistic visit.

Nirupama Rao visited Islamabad to prepare the ground work for the visits of Mr. P. Chidambaram, followed by the visit of Mr. S. M. Krishna, Indian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Ministers of both the countries will meet on July 15, 2010 in Islamabad. This will be the next crucial step in the direction of enhancing Indo-Pak bilateral ties.

During the Indian Foreign Secretary and Home Minister’s visits, issues related to mutual concerns were raised. Cross border terrorism by networks such as Lashker-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jamaat-ud-Dawah remained the prime concern of India, along with issues such as the trial of Pakistani suspects linked to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and infiltrations across the Line of Control. However, as witnessed earlier, Pakistan’s indifference has been apparent as they did not offer any assurances to root-out anti-India activities from their soil.

The only positive aspect of the visit was Pakistan’s keen interest to start trade talks with India. In a move to bolster economic ties between the two countries, Islamabad is considering reciprocating the long-unrequited Indian gesture of treating it as a Most Favoured Nation (MFN). Although, India gave Pakistan the status of an MFN in 1996, yet Islamabad is reluctant to grant India the same status. Currently, bilateral trade between two countries amounts to $2.2 billion. If relations improve it may even touch $10 billion as estimated by the FICCI.

However, be that as it may, India continues to witness Pakistan’s negligence or ‘blasé attitude’ where Indian sentiments are concerned. During the meet between Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik and the Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram, the Indian flag was displayed upside down. However, India chose to downplay the issue. It might be useful to point out that the incident is not without precedence; in 2005 when a special PIA plane with President Pervez Musharraf flew from Islamabad to Jaipur, the Indian flag was upside down. The repeated mistakes raise doubts about Pakistan’s intentions to honour Indian sentiments and appear to be a deliberate attempt on their part to appease fundamentalist forces.

The recent turmoil in Kashmir witnessed the first Army march in Srinagar in a decade, to normalise the deteriorating situation in the Jammu and Kashmir. On July 7, 2010 the Congress, held Pakistan responsible for the ongoing mayhem in J&K. The Congress spokesperson Jayanthi Natarajan said that “elements from across the border and the separatists inimical to the unity of our country are trying to create tension and violence in the valley” and suggested the Centre should take up the issue with Islamabad.

The Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram articulated the Indian government’s position and blamed LeT for the outbreak of violence in J&K. The Congress stand strengthens the position taken by Chidambaram. The weakening situation in J&K may have a bearing on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s outreach to Pakistan for the restoration of normal ties. In fact, it has been noted in the past that whenever India tries to normalise relations with Pakistan, the fundamentalist forces in Pakistan increase their anti-India and terrorist activities in the Kashmir Valley as well as in the rest of the Indian Territory.

India has always maintained that a stable Pakistan is essential for India’s security. Therefore, Indo-Pak dialogue and discussion is a necessary process. However, the Indian dilemma lies in the fact that New Delhi is not able to identify the appropriate authority within Pakistan with whom to initiate fruitful talks and therefore each attempt is met with a setback. There is always skepticism over what the Pakistan’s civilian government will or can offer India for strengthening bilateral relations.

Radicalisation of Pakistani middle class is rising; thus the secularisation of Pakistan is a far reaching dream. Islam per se is not dangerous but an inclusive and a hard-line interpretation of Islam can definitely be catastrophic. Had fundamentalist forces been open minded about this issue, the present world would have been more peaceful.

Track-II initiatives like ‘Aman ki Asha’ taken by the Times of India Group in collaboration with Jang Group of Pakistan may not achieve the desired result as this sort of media centric initiative cannot go to the root of the problem and address core issues of concern. The crisis between India and Pakistan is political and political crises require political solution. Therefore, a strong political will is required from both sides for achieving long-term peace.

Pakistan is also a victim of the scourge of terrorism that has claimed the lives of several innocents. Therefore, the need of the hour for Pakistan is to uproot the bane of extremism from its backyard. On India’s part, the government should mobilise the international community to put pressure on Pakistan to restrain extremist tendencies and terrorist activities originating from their soil. It will be interesting to see the outcome of the forthcoming meeting of the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers at Islamabad on July 15, but the track record of such meetings between the neighbours does not foster optimism.

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India-Russia Defence and Strategic Ties By Dr. Amit Singh

NMF Commentary
April 23, 2010
Varuna Complex, Airport Road,
NH - 8, New Delhi - 110010
Tel: +91-11-2615 4901
Tele fax: +91-11-2615652
Website: http://www.maritimeindia.org/

Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on April 23, 2010

Defence relations and strategic ties are an important yardstick for assessing overall Defence relations and strategic ties are an important yardstick for assessing overall relations between two countries. Going by the same, the India-Russia relationship can be characterised as “time tested” and based on “mutual trust and understanding”. However, subsequent to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India-Russia relations have witnessed a period of uncertainty. Moreover, in recent years, Indian foreign policy appears to have witnessed a shift in seeking to improve ties with the United States. Notwithstanding these developments, India continues to nurture relations with Russia.

New Delhi and Moscow have maintained military ties since the former Soviet Union signed the first agreement to supply MiG-21 aircraft to India in 1964. Since then, several agreements have been signed, and today technical cooperation between the two is close to US $50 billion. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India purchases 77 per cent of its military hardware from Russia. However, recent trends indicate that New Delhi is looking to diversify its sources of weapons import and is sourcing from Israel and the United States as well.

The March 2010 visit of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi suggested a new commitment on the part of Moscow to put relations with New Delhi on a higher plane. This was Putin’s fifth visit since 2000 and the period is being hailed as the “Putin Decade”. During the visit, Putin pointed out that “India had been Russia’s strategic partner for decades”. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on his part, said relations with Russia was a “key pillar of India’s foreign policy”. Russia’s assistance has been of great strategic significance for India. This includes sharing of some critical military R&D information with India, as well as supply of equipment and technology for the construction of military aircraft, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, ships, missiles, space vehicles and nuclear reactors. Moreover, respecting Indian concerns, Russia has never sold any weapons to Pakistan. Russia has further cemented this relationship by supporting observer status for India in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) despite Chinese reluctance.

Prime Minister Putin’s March visit to New Delhi was occasion for discussions on a wide range of issues of mutual concern and the signing of several agreements, including defence deals worth US $4 billion and a civil nuclear pact. Russia is in the process of building two nuclear power units in Kundankulam, Tamil Nadu and has agreed to construct at least 12 more Russian nuclear reactors in India: six in Kudankulam and six in West Bengal’s Haripur. Russia has also agreed to transfer reactor technology and help in the progressive indigenisation of supplies for the reactors. The India-Russia civil nuclear pact is a major breakthrough for India in energy security.

The civil nuclear pact with Russia is different from the India-US nuclear deal since Russia did not compel India to first clear a nuclear liability agreement. Some experts have expressed their concern over the 123 Agreement of the India-US nuclear deal, claiming that it might compromise India's sovereignty and right to conduct nuclear tests. If India wishes to end this nuclear deal in the future, it will have to return all nuclear reactors and fuel supplied by the USA, along with huge compensation. The 123 Agreement also gives greater leverage to US entities as compared to their Indian counterparts working in the same sector. On the other hand, the nuclear pact with Russia does not contain such stringent provisions and is more balanced, based as it is, on mutual trust and goodwill. Russia also guarantees India unrestricted supply of nuclear fuel under any circumstances.

In the light of this situation, a critical question is how the United States views this India-Russia nuclear pact? It seems likely that the latest nuclear pact with Russia might put pressure on Washington to engage with New Delhi and resolve problems lingering with the India-US nuclear deal. It will be interesting to see the outcome of the upcoming NPT Review Conference in New York in May 2010, as the US aims to get a more meaningful result than the recently held Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. Recently, the United States and India ‘finalised’ the procedures for reprocessing of spent atomic fuel, one of the last outstanding elements of the 2008 civil nuclear energy deal. This could be seen as one issue catalyzed by the India-Russia Civil Nuclear Pact.

During Prime Minister Putin’s visit, Russia and India signed preliminary agreements for the joint manufacturing and development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). India is likely to sign a new contract with Russia to buy 40 additional Su-30MKI multi dynamic fighter aircrafts, bringing the total number of these aircraft imports to 230. This represents a significant boost to the capabilities of the Indian Air Force and will enhance India's aircraft building capabilities in the near future. Russia has also agreed to provide exclusive access to the GLONASS global positioning system, which is indispensable for precision targeting of guided missiles. Both leaders also discussed the progress of assembling Russia's new T-90 tanks (called ‘Bhishma’ in India) which are being built in India under Russian license at a domestic plant near Chennai. Earlier, the licensed production of T-90 tanks had been stalled due to a disagreement with Russia over transfer of technology, which was resolved in 2008. By 2020, India plans to produce around 1,000 T-90 tanks, an undertaking that would only be possible if Russia willingly supplies the related parts and technology.

Russia is the biggest arms and ammunition supplier to the Indian Navy and the recent visit of Putin has benefited the Indian Navy considerably. The two sides signed several deals, including renegotiation on the price of the aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, sale of 29 MiG-29K fighter jets and an agreement to jointly develop a transport aircraft. By 2013, Russia will hand over the retrofitted Gorshkov to India, complete with 16 MiG-29K fighters. Another batch of 13 planes will provide air power to India's indigenous aircraft carrier under construction at the Cochin shipyard. Gorshkov was bought by the Indian Navy in 2004 and rechristened Vikramaditya. The warship, purchased originally at a price of US $974 million, is currently undergoing a refit at the Russian Sevmash shipyard. Since 2007, the Russian shipyard has been demanding a hike in the price for the warship's refit programme and had revised the cost of the project to US $2.9 billion. Though India and Russia sealed the deal on US $2.3 billion as a revised price for the project, the aircraft carrier refurbishment for India is already four years late and has overshot the budget. In the next two months, India will receive a Russian-built nuclear submarine on a ten-year lease, which will give the Indian Navy invaluable experience for future operations.

The Indian Navy has undergone extensive modernisation and expansion with an intention to make it a credible ‘Blue-Water’ capable force. Russia has helped the Indian Navy by transferring technology and equipment. If this assistance continues, the Indian Navy could soon become one of the most credible navies operating in the Indian Ocean. Empowering Indian Navy will also benefit Russia by helping it to keep a close eye on the strategically important Indian Ocean Region.

During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s December 2009 visit to Russia, both countries had issued a joint statement expressing concern over recent developments in Afghanistan and expressing their commitment towards restoring peace and stability in the region by tackling terrorism and jihadi ideology. There is a possibility that the US might quit Afghanistan due to financial problems, increasing internal and external pressure. The US policy decision to reconcile with the Taliban and perhaps offer it the option to share power could jeopardise the stability of the entire region, including Central and South Asia and Southern Russia. India will be adversely affected. Fighting terrorism could be more effective if India and Russia prepare a joint road map to take on Islamist extremism. The March 2010 suicide bombings at Moscow metro stations and in South Russia have highlighted the urgency for like-minded states to work jointly to curb terrorism. Speaking on these attacks the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “The bombings may have Pakistani connections and the militants operating from Afghan-Pakistan border”. Putin’s recent visit to New Delhi also envisioned tackling terrorism but this decision requires immediate implementation as security experts have warned Russia about more terrorist attacks.

Asia remains the main focus of Russian foreign policy and Moscow considers India to be the most important player in the region. Bilateral trade with India is expected to increase from US $7 billion in 2008 to US $10 billion by the end of 2010. At the same time, there is a need to bolster existing mutual cooperation between the two countries on several critical issues such as defence and security, space technology, atomic energy, terrorism and trade. The relationship has now progressed from a buyer-seller to that of a limited co-producer in the areas of design, development and scientific research.

Despite good relations between India and Russia, there are certain chinks in the armour that need to be addressed. This is most so in the area of defence supplies. The lack of transparency on the Russian side appears to be a significant hurdle. This is because sometimes Russian military supplies are sub-standard or ex-stock equipment. Doubts have also been raised on the quality of Russian products, the problem of spare parts, delays in delivery as well as problems in upgrading and modernising.

At a more general level, Russia also needs to liberalise visa and registration formalities for small Indian investors so as to enhance mutual cooperation and trade. On the international front, both countries could work towards cementing their strategic partnerships through BRIC and SCO. There must be a concerted effort to overcome differences, increase people to people contact and conduct joint military exercises. An abiding commitment, positive attitude and strong “political will” are essential for improving bilateral ties between the two countries. This is an opportune time to reinforce the relationship in the backdrop of a rapidly changing global order.

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Indians Down Under By Dr. Amit Singh

NMF Commentary
February 25, 2010

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Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on February 25, 2010

Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna met his Australian counterpart, Stephen Smith, in London on January 27, 2010 to discuss the issue of safety and security of Indian students in Australia. Due to the pressure mounted by the Indian authorities, the Australian government has set up a high-level group to look into the matter. Mr. Smith assured his Indian counterpart that the attacks would be investigated and action taken. The Australian government also handed over a Police Dossier to India, prepared by the Victoria Police on attacks targeting Indians over the past one year. Initially, the Australian government had resisted providing any information to India.

Addressing the Australian Parliament on February 9, 2010, Australian Foreign Minister noted that some of the violence against Indians had been racially motivated. However, there are also some reverse patterns showing Indians involved in two of the three fatal attacks and reports suggest that internal disputes were the source.

The spate of attacks on Indians in Australia has strained Indo-Oz bilateral ties and has sparked off a debate on racism. Apart from the murder of Nitin Garg and the setting ablaze of another Indian a few days later, there have been reports of constant maltreatment and thrashing of Indian taxi drivers, bars refusing entry to Indians, vandalizing of a gurudwara and so on. The majority of these attacks have occurred in Melbourne. In most of the cases, the Australian police refused to lodge any complaints.

Australian authorities have refused to categorise these attacks as “racist”. Australia has argued that the Indian media is whipping up a storm because they were miffed by Australia’s refusal to sell uranium to India. However, at the Sunday morning prayer on January 24, 2010 at St. Paul's Cathedral in Melbourne, the Australian bishop Philip Huggins, urged parishioners to listen to the concerns of the Indian community, whom he described as “oppressed in this land”. He pleaded for forgiveness for “prejudice and indifference” to people from different countries. Australia’s former Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove has stated that the nature of attacks against Indians made it easy to conclude they were racially motivated. The Victorian Police Commissioner Simon Overland has also admitted that the police have known for two years that Indian students have been specifically targeted.

This is not the first time that race related violence has manifested in Australia. In December 2005, a series of racially motivated confrontations between Middle Easterners and Australians had led to mob violence. At that time, rioters draped in Australian flags and fortified with beer had assaulted anyone with Middle Eastern looks. As noted by Katharine Betts of Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, the opinion polls in Australia on multiculturalism and the immigration policy consistently show that approximately 70 per cent Australians are opposed to immigration. The polls also suggest that about a quarter of Australians hate Asians. 

Despite the official claims, is Australia truly a multicultural country? In 1901, the Australian Government introduced the Immigration Restriction Act, later called as the “White Australia” policy, which deliberately restricted non-white immigration to Australia from 1901 to 1973. Over time, the Liberal Party Government under Robert Menzies further propagated the fear of Asian expansion and Communism. The act of separating Aboriginal children from their families and the denial of full citizenship rights to Aboriginal people and the Torres Strait Island people are the most telling examples of racism. After 1973, the “White Australia” policy for all practical purposes became defunct, and, in 1975, the Australian government passed the Racial Discrimination Act, which made racially-biased selection criteria illegal.

Multiculturalism as a policy has changed enormously since its formal introduction in Australia. Originally, it was seen by the mainstream population as recognition of the fact that Australians came from different cultures and ethnicities and continued to maintain ties with their roots. The election of John Howard’s Liberal-National Coalition government in 1996 was a watershed in Australian race relations. Howard had long been a critic of multiculturalism, releasing his “One Australia Policy” in the late 1980s, which called for a reduction in Asian immigration. Shortly, after the Howard’s government assumed office, the new independent member Pauline Hanson made her maiden speech in which she declared that, “A multicultural society can never be strong”.

Opposition to multiculturalism in Australia is evident in the case of Islamic immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the main targets of anti-immigration campaigns were immigrants from southern Europe and later East Asia. In 2006, the Federal Government of Australia proposed to introduce a compulsory citizenship test, which would assess English skills and knowledge of Australian values. In January 2007, the Howard Government also removed the word ‘multicultural’ from the name of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, changing its name to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. This sparked renewed debate over the future of multiculturalism in Australia.

The example of Dr. Haneef Mohammed and controversies related to the Indian cricket team in Australia once again highlighted the prevailing racial orientation of Australian society. Dr. Haneef, an Indian physician, was wrongly picked up in Australia on July 2, 2007, for his “alleged” role in the UK terror plot, was maltreated and interrogated for belonging to a particular religion. In the case of Australian cricketer Andrew Symonds, the Australian media tried to depict him as Hanuman, thereby exhibiting their lack of respect towards other cultures and religious sentiments.

According to The World Factbook of Central Intelligence Agency, USA, the total population of Australia is 21,262,641 (July 2009 est.) constituting 92 percent Whites, 7 percent Asian, 1 percent Aborigines and others. Indians are the tenth most important source of immigrants to Australia. The first Indians who arrived in Australia were mainly Sikhs and Muslims from the Punjab region in north-western India. Between 1860 and 1901, more Indians arrived and worked as agricultural labourers, hawkers and domestic help. A number of Indians also worked in the gold fields. Migration from India was curtailed after the Australian Government introduced the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, but following India's independence from Britain in 1947, the number of Anglo-Indians and Indian-born British citizens immigrating to Australia increased. These British citizens decided to settle in Australia in large numbers but are still counted as 'Indian' Nationals in the census. The third wave of Indians entered the country in the 1980s, after the abolition of the White Australia Policy. After the policy was abolished many Indian teachers and doctors settled in Australia. Another big influx began with the IT revolution. Large numbers of Indian software professionals arrived in Australia from 1976 onwards. After the successive military coups in Fiji of 1987 and 2000 a significant number of Indo-Fijian migrated to Australia and as such there is a large Indo-Fijian population in Australia. Indo-Fijian population has significantly impacted the character of the Indian community in Australia. While earlier Indian migration was comprised primarily with educated professionals, the Indo-Fijian community not only comprised largely of professionals but also brought many small business owners and entrepreneurs to Australia.

The current wave of Indian migration is that of engineers, tool-makers, Gujarati businessmen from East Africa, relatives of settled Indians and students. According to Indian Diaspora Report (2001), Indians are 1.2 percent of the total Australian population numbering about 190,000 which include forty thousand Indo-Fijian and more than ten thousand from Africa, UK and Malaysia.

Indians have done comparatively well in Australia especially in the field of IT and medicine. Indian students comprise the second largest ethnic group after the Chinese. International students are worth $13bn (£8.1bn) to the Australian economy each year, after coal and iron ore. According to the Australia's Tourism Forecasting Committee (TFC), the drop in the number of Indian students is expected to cost Australia almost $70m (£44m) this year. From 2004 to 2009 the number of Indians studying in Australia rose from 30,000 to 97,000 with 45,000 of these living in Melbourne, 32,000 in Adelaide and the remainder in Sydney, Brisbane and Perth but these repeated attacks on Indians have led to a fifty percent downfall of Indian students registering with Australian universities especially vocational colleges.

If Australia wishes to remain a multicultural nation, it needs to clamp down hard on racially motivated attacks and behaviour. The Indian Government should formulate a comprehensive policy to deal with the issues on security of the Indians worldwide. In the Australian case, India needs to sustain the diplomatic initiative with Australia and pressurise Canberra to take swift action to ensure the security of the Indian community. India should also mobilise the international community against the racial attacks on Indians in Australia without jeopardising bilateral relations. Australia, on the other hand, should also understand that in the present global scenario, empathetic multicultural policies are beneficial for development. It should not be overlooked that the strategic partnership between these two Indian Ocean democracies is essential for creating a coalition of democracies in the Indian Ocean Region.

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