Flourishing Ties between India and Myanmar

Author: Amit Singh *

Date: February 28, 2013

Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi

Myanmar is an important neighbour of India as both countries share extensive land border and a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. During the long spell of military rule in Myanmar, India followed a policy of disengagement. However, India eased upon this and closed in somewhat after initiating the “Look-East” policy in 1991. The recent democratisation process in Myanmar has further prepared the ground for India to be more proactive in her Myanmar Policy.

The Defence Minister of India Shri AK Antony visited Naypyidaw along with the Defence Secretary, the Eastern Army Commander and the Vice Chief of Naval Staff on January 21-22, 2013. During the visit, Antony highlighted upon the importance of enhancing bilateral ties with Naypyidaw in all the fields, especially defence. He underlined that the visit of all three Service Chiefs of India to Myanmar in the last eighteen months was reflective of Indian government wishes to strengthen ties with Myanmar. While interacting with the delegation, the President of Myanmar Thien Sein assured that Myanmar will not allow its territory to be used by anti-India insurgent groups. He also welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the armed forces of both the countries and anticipated an enhanced interaction between the two navies and the air forces.

Prior to Antony’s visit, several high level bilateral exchanges had taken place in the recent past. In October 2011, the President of Myanmar visited New Delhi and was followed by a return visit in May 2012 by the Indian Prime Minister. The pro-democracy activist and the leader of the opposition Ms.Aung San Suu Kyi visited India in November 2012 and the External Affairs Minister of India; Shri SalmanKhurshid visited Myanmar in December 2012 furthering official engagement. The frequency of bilateral interactions between New Delhi and Naypyidaw is noteworthy and has the potential of further elevating the India-Myanmar relationship to a new level.

At present, both New Delhi and Naypyidaw are engaged at regional and sub-regional contexts onMekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Consequently, in August 2008 Myanmar was accorded the ‘Observer Status’ in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with India’s support and is now looking forward to be included as a permanent member of SAARC.

Myanmar’s close economic and military relations with Beijing are a cause of concern for New Delhi. This is mainly because China has been actively engaged in Myanmar to build up port and naval facilities inHanggi, the Coco Islands, Akyab and Mergui all of which increase its footprint in the Indian Ocean. Indian media had been particularly concerned about a rumoured intelligence listening post on the Coco islands, only 30 nautical miles away from the Andaman Islands – which are much closer to Myanmar’s mainland than to the east coast of mainland India. Myanmar is the largest neighbour touching India’s east and acts as a buffer zone between its North-Eastern region and the Chinese provinces.

Myanmar also holds an important geostrategic position in the Asia-Pacific region and provides a strategic link to the East and South-East Asian countries. Therefore, further improvement of relations with Myanmar has become desirable requirement not just for India, but for the US as well. Recently, US President Barack Obama visited Naypyidaw, reflecting the importance attached to Myanmar as a potential strategic partner in his Asia-Pacific calculus that aims towards Rebalancing Asia. China, on the other hand believes that the US policy is an attempt to curb Beijing’s regional influence. In Washington’sRebalancing Asia policy, India holds a significant place as the US President himself saying India as “Pivot of Asia”. Therefore, the US is also urging India to engage more proactively with Myanmar. However, it is not US pressure; but a more consensual approach of building a lasting friendship based on bilateral trust that is driving New Delhi at this juncture. India has also recognised Myanmar as a crucial link between India and China which clearly reflects India’s desire to increase its profile in Myanmar withoutjeopardising its bilateral ties with China.

For maintaining peace in North-East, it is in India’s security interest to keep the momentum going in the right direction with Myanmar, since most of the active insurgent groups in this region are using the bordering areas as their safe havens. Although there have been some joint counter insurgency efforts between the two armies along the border, these needs to be intensified on a regular basis.

India looks at the connectivity through Myanmar as being crucial for its “Look East” policy and also for the development of stronger ties with the ASEAN countries as an extended neighbourhood. At present, both India and Myanmar are jointly working on quite a few projects, namely, the up-gradation and resurfacing of the 160 km long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road, construction and up-gradation of the Rhi-Tiddim Road in Myanmar, etc. India is also implementing the Kaladan multimodal transport project that involves upgrading the Sittwe port in Myanmar and constructing a highway to connect the town ofPaletwa in Chin state to the border state in Mizoram. This flagship project, expected to be completed by 2015 will revitalize the economy of that area and link it with important commercial and shipping arteries. The Chief Secretary of the Manipur government has also announced the long-awaited luxury bus service between Imphal and Mandalay, the first over link between India and Myanmar. This connectivity holds the potential to integrate India’s North-East with the broader ASEAN’s inter-connectivity efforts with substantial benefits for both, India and Myanmar. Furthermore, Myanmar is extremely rich in natural resources, notably oil and gas and closer relations with Myanmar would facilitate India’s energy requirements too.

Recently, the Lok Sabha Speaker Smt. Meira Kumar led the first-ever visit of an Indian parliamentary delegation to Myanmar from 12-15 February, 2013. While interacting with the Indian parliamentary delegation, the President of Myanmar Thien Sein hoped that present visit of Indian Parliamentary delegation will not only contribute to strengthen relations between the two Parliaments but also between the two countries. Smt. Kumar also alluded the training availed of by the 30 MPs of Myanmar and 30 Myanmar Parliamentary staff in India. The present pace and growing momentum in India-Myanmar relations indicates that the bilateral ties are indeed poised to flourish in the near future.

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International Business Times (US Edition) quoted me on the South China Sea Dispute.

India and China Foreign Ministers Discuss South China Sea Disputes

Palash R. Ghosh | April 13 2012 | International Business Times

The foreign ministers of India and China discussed their disputes over the South China Sea on the sidelines of the Russia-India-China trilateral conference in Moscow on Friday.

India’s External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi emphasized that the two Asian giants need to resolve issues related to the South China Sea, including a plan by India’s state-owned oil and Gas Company, Oil and Natural Gas Corp., to drill for oil in the international waters.

India has signed joint agreements with Vietnam on energy projects in the disputed waters. According to The Hindu, prior to the meeting, Krishna said that trade along international waters should be open to all nations, and that India’s oil exploration activities in the sea was a purely commercial enterprise with no political meaning whatsoever.

China has previously warned India away from exploration projects in the South China Sea. Wu Shicun, president of the government-run National Institute of South China, told the Times of India newspaper: China will not stand any joint cooperation in our claimed maritime areas.” Wu added that India’s involvement in the sea would entail a lot of economic and political risks. In response, Ashwani Kumar, an Indian government minister, told the Times of India: South China Sea is the property of the world. Nobody has a unilateral control over it and India is capable enough of safeguarding its interests.

Similarly, Krishna described the South China Sea as property of the world.

Explaining India’s interest in the South China Sea, Amit Singh Research Associate, National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, wrote: India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the [South China Sea]. The [South China Sea] is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia.”

Singh added: “Almost, 55 percent of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the [South China Sea]. Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and [South] Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin [Russia] to Mangalore [India] through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region. If China continues to assert dominance over these waters, it will be difficult for India to continue with its activities through this channel.”

China is also engaged in contentious dispute with Vietnam and the Philippines and other Asian nations over the South China Sea. The Times of India reported that China directly controls seven of 52 islands in Spratly Islands area of sea -- however, it claims ownership of 90 percent of area. Currently, Vietnam has control over 40 of islands, Philippines controls nine, Malaysia controls five and Taiwan control one island.

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चीन से ज्यादा सुदृढ़ है भारतीय नौसेना: विशेषज्ञ

चीन से ज्यादा सुदृढ़ है भारतीय नौसेना: विशेषज्ञ

राष्ट्रीय सहारा, अप्रैल 5, 2012, पेज न. 15, नई दिल्ली 

नई दिल्ली (एजेंसी)। विशेषज्ञों के अनुसार भारतीय नौसेना अपनी समुद्री सीमा की रक्षा करने में पूरी तरह सक्षम है और क्षेत्र में प्रभावशाली चीन के मुकाबले काफी सुदृढ़ भी है। लेकिन समुद्री क्षेत्र के बढ़ते महत्व के मद्देनजर इसे और सशक्त बनाए जाने की जरूरत है। दिल्ली स्थित ‘नेशनल मैरिटाइम फाउंडेशन’ में ‘एसोसिएट फेलो’ और विदेशी मामलों के विशेषज्ञ डॉ. अमित सिंह का कहना है कि पांच अप्रैल को मनाए जाने वाले राष्ट्रीय मैरिटाइम दिवस जैसे आयोजन समुद्री क्षेत्र को दिए जाने वाले महत्व को दर्शाते हैं। उन्होंने कहा, “देश की विशाल समुद्री सीमा को देखते हुए नौसेना पर सबसे अधिक ध्यान देने की जरूरत है और हम इसमें काफी हद तक सफल भी रहे हैं। इसका सबसे बड़ा उदाहरण है कि क्षेत्र में सामरिक मामले में प्रभावशाली चीन की नौसेना हमसे लगभग 10 साल पीछे है।” डॉ. अमित ने कहा, “हमारे पास विमानवाहक युद्धपोत मौजूद है जबकि चीन अभी यह क्षमता पाने की कवायद में ही जुटा है। इसके अलावा भारत अपने बेड़े में परमाणु ईधन से चलने वाली पनडुब्बियों को भी शामिल कर रहा है।” क्षेत्र में चीन के बढ़ते प्रभाव के बारे में अमित ने कहा, “चीन की कथनी व करनी में मौजूद बड़े अंतर और उसके आक्रामक रुख को देखते हुए हम उस पर पूरी तरह भरोसा नहीं कर पाते। हाल के वर्षो में समुद्री क्षेत्र में उसकी बढ़ती हुई गतिविधियों से हमें सतर्क रहने की जरूरत है।”

उन्होंने कहा कि समुद्री क्षेत्र पर अपनी पकड़ को और मजबूत बनाने के लिए हमें क्षेत्र में अपने लिए सहयोग बढ़ाने पर बल देना चाहिए। अमित ने कहा, “मुंबई हमलों में समुद्री क्षेत्र के इस्तेमाल की सच्चाई को हमें हमेशा याद रखना चाहिए और भविष्य में इस तरह के वाकयों से बचने के लिए तटों की सुरक्षा की समीक्षा होती रहनी चाहिए।” पाकिस्तान व श्रीलंका के साथ मछुआरों की समस्या और समुद्री डकैती के मुद्दों पर उन्होंने कहा कि इसके लिए हमें अपने कानून को और पुख्ता बनाने की जरूरत है।

Few Web Links:

1. Jansatta
2. Dainik Jagran
3. Dainik Tribune

The All New Myanmar By Dr. Amit Singh

NMF Commentary

January 04, 2012

Varuna Complex, Airport Road,
NH - 8, New Delhi - 110010
Tel: +91-11-26154901
Tele fax: +91-11-26156520

Website:  www.maritimeindia.org

Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on January 04, 2012

Myanmar is going through an unprecedented political and socio-cultural transformation. During the past five decades of military-rule, the country witnessed suppression of democratic norms/institutions, human rights violations, armed insurgencies by the sidelined ethnic minorities, detention of the opposition activists and leaders, especially the Nobel Peace laureate Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the economic policies enforced by the junta left most of the common people impoverished.

The winds of change in Myanmar started soon after the November 2010 General Elections, which ended the decades-old era of military-rule in the country. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) were declared victorious. However, the international community and United Nations (UN) expressed doubts over the credibility of the election-results and termed it as a ‘sham’. In fact, some of the clauses in the 2008 constitution or the third constitution of Myanmar, promulgated by the junta before the elections, barred ASSK, the country’s prominent pro-democratic face, from contesting the elections. Consequently, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted the elections saying electoral laws were ‘unfair’.

Truth to tell, no one expected any reforms under the new ‘civilian’ Government. But the former military rulers surprised their critics by introducing political changes that were unthinkable just a few months ago. Thein Sein, the newly elected President has advocated a reformist-agenda, and has reached out to ASSK (she has been agitating for democracy in Myanmar since more than 20 years and spent almost last 15 years under house arrest). He has gone ahead and established the National Human Rights Commission, implemented of a new labour law in consultation with the International Labour Organisation, relaxed restriction on the media, allowed some economic liberalisation and release of hundreds of political prisoners. Although, the reasons behind this sudden shift remain unclear, but observers believe the Government introduced political reform has been driven by a need to mobilise support for Myanmar’s bid for the 2014 ASEAN Chairmanship.

The recent reforms that include amendments in electoral laws have encouraged ASSK and her party NLD to contest the upcoming by-elections, for nearly 48 vacant seats in the Parliament, to be held in early 2012 (March/April-though no date has yet been announced). To facilitate NLD’s return to the mainstream politics, the Election Commission of Myanmar has already approved its application to officially re-register as a political party and also pledged to hold free and fair by-elections.

The United States and Myanmar

The democratisation process in Myanmar also resulted in the historic three-day visit of the US’ Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton from November 30-December 2, 2011. She was the first US Foreign Policy Chief to visit Myanmar in more than half a century since the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles visited the country in 1955.

During her visit, Clinton notably met Myanmar's President Thein Sein and praised the pro-democratic reforms initiated by the new government and urged Naypyidaw to take further steps towards national reconciliation by releasing remaining political prisoners and end ethnic conflicts. She also reminded that the better ties would be impossible unless Myanmar break-off its military ties and suspected nuclear links with North Korea. She told Thein Sein that the US will support more aid for Myanmar and consider re-establishing ambassador-level contact with Naypyidaw, after a lull of two decades, and would also consider easing sanctions if the government shows genuine reforms progress. Balancing both the ruling and the opposition party, Clinton also met ASSK in Yangon.

The US is now appears to be recalibrating its policy vis-à-vis Myanmar as over the time, Washington has realized that the policy of imposing economic sanctions proved counter-productive and rather it motivated Naypyidaw to seek closer ties with Beijing. The maritime manoeuvre of the PLA Navy in the South China Sea also encouraged US to shift its policy framework from West Asia to Indo-Pacific, where most countries are concerned about the growing Chinese assertiveness. Therefore, to balance China in the region, the US is strengthening its alliances and if Myanmar could be made to realign more towards the West, it would be a major game-changer in the region.

India and Myanmar

India’s contacts with Myanmar go back to the pre-Christian era. Myanmar also came under the spell of Indian cultural influence, as Buddhism spread directly from India and indirectly through Ceylon, profoundly influencing all spheres of Burmese life. A large population of Indian origin (according to the 2001 report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, the total number of ethnic Indians in Myanmar is estimated to be around 2.9 million) lives in Myanmar without having any political rights or recognition.

India and Myanmar are jointly working on several projects both in infrastructural and non-infrastructural areas, including up-gradation and resurfacing of the 160 km-long Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road, construction and up-gradation of the Rhi-Tiddim Road in Myanmar, the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project. The bilateral trade between both countries increased significantly from US$ 12.4 million in 1980-81 to US$ 1207.56 million in 2009-10. New Delhi and Naypyidaw are also engaged with each other on regional and sub-regional context through Mekong-Ganga Co-operation, ASEAN and BIMSTEC. In August 2008, Myanmar was given the observer status in the SAARC with India’s help and now Myanmar is eyeing SAARC’s permanent membership as the country is geographically a part of extended South Asia region.

Myanmar’s bid for the entry into SAARC has not been seen differently as India and Myanmar share a long land border of over 1600 km and a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar is the largest country touching India’s eastern border and acts as a buffer state between India’s North-eastern region and the Chinese provinces. Myanmar is extremely rich in natural resources, notably oil and gas. Therefore, cordial relations with Myanmar can facilitate India’s energy requirements.

Moreover, Myanmar’s Navy is operating in the Bay of Bengal and India does not want hostile relations with this neighbour, as Naypyidaw shares good relations with Beijing. Chinese Navy is already looking for a strong base in the Bay of Bengal and if Myanmar ‘allows’ Chinese naval forces to have access to the Bay of Bengal, it would be a major threat for India’s security. For maintaining peace in the North-Eastern region, it is in India’s internal security interest to keep the momentum going in the right direction with Myanmar. Most of the insurgent groups active in North-Eastern states of India are using the bordering areas of Myanmar as a safe haven. In fact, on December 3, 2011, there were reports that the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA’s) top leader Lt. Col. Jibon Moran was arrested in Myanmar along with an Indian journalist.

The newly elected President of Myanmar Thein Sein paid a State visit to India on October 12-15, 2011. During the visit India congratulated Myanmar on their transition towards democracy and offered all necessary assistance in further strengthening this transition, in an inclusive and broad based manner. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Myanmar reiterated their shared commitment to strengthening and broadening the multifaceted relationship based on shared history, civilisational ties and close religious, linguistic and cultural affinities, and to take it to a new level.

Conclusion

The continuing democratic reforms in Naypyidaw can be seen as “a new Avatar” of Myanmar, which could have a positive bearing on the entire region. The President ordered ceasefire in Kachin State in December 2011 and the recently signed deal with the southern Shan state is a major step forward. There is speculation that almost all political prisoners in Myanmar will be given amnesty by the end of February 2012. This could be an overt way of meeting international community’s demand, as Hillary Clinton said on a recent visit to Myanmar that Washington wants to see an end to decades of fighting with rebel groups before it normalises relations with Naypyidaw.

After Ms Clinton’s successful visit, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague is scheduled to visit Myanmar in early January 2012 to continue constructive engagement with its government leaders. India too is sending its Army Chief General VK Singh on a five-day visit to Naypyidaw starting from January 05, 2012, to discuss matters related to the internal security.

Like every other nation in this time and age, the future of Myanmar lies in democracy and the transition will be possible if the present government peacefully resolves their decades-old ethnic issues. The Myanmar’s authorities could consider favourably the demands of revising the 2008 constitution since the ethnic groups find no space for themselves in new constitution. Decentralising the power or adopting the federal structure may help in accommodating all the stakeholders in Myanmar. However, the authorities have their own scepticism over federalism and fear that Myanmar would disintegrate under federalism. Here, New Delhi can help Naypyidaw by sharing their own experiences on the decentralisation of powers.

On January 02, 2012, the Chief Secretary of Manipur announced the long-awaited luxury bus service between Imphal and Mandalay, to be launched by March 2012, which will be the first proper link between India and Myanmar. This connectivity holds the potential to integrate India’s North-Eastern region with the broader ASEAN’s inter-connectivity effort in future, with consequential benefits for both, India and Myanmar. This is, therefore, an opportune time for India to substantially, rather than symbolically, recalibrate its foreign policy towards Myanmar. This recalibration can pay rich dividends to its ongoing Look-East Policy.

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South China Sea Dispute and India

25 September 2011

Amit Singh*                                                                          

Research Associate, 

National Maritime Foundation, 

New Delhi

Published by The SAEA Group, Singapore on September 25. 2011

Shared by The National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi and Voice of India

Conflicting claims over islands and maritime zones in the South China Sea (SCS) has been a longstanding security issue between China, Taiwan and five Southeast Asian countries. The recent uptick in tensions in the SCS underscores the volatile nature of the problem, only conforming fears that it is a major “regional security flashpoint” with global consequences.

In a submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) in May 2009, Beijing claimed the entire SCS and made its first effort to include the region as a "core national interest", similar to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang province. In response, the US rejects the China's claims to sovereignty over the entire SCS emphasizing that the American national interest is served by the freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the SCS.

China’s hard line on the SCS has affected India too. New Delhi was a bit taken aback after Beijing denounced plans by an Indian Company to develop oil fields in the region. The Chinese objection was to ONGC Videsh’s (OVL) venture for off-shore oil exploration in water’s belonging to Vietnam (not recognized by China), Beijing urged India to refrain from entering into deals with Vietnamese firms exploring oil and gas in the disputed SCS over which China enjoys ‘indisputable’ sovereignty.

However, while China opposes India’s entry into the SCS, it insists on building strategic projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) and on deploying troops there. There were recently unconfirmed reports of confrontation between the Chinese warship and INS Airavat in the international waters of SCS. India has responded to Chinese objections by stating that its cooperation with Vietnam is in accordance with international laws. During SM Krishna’s visit to Hanoi on September 15-17, 2011, the External Affairs Minister of India underlined that OVL will go ahead with oil and gas exploration in the two offshore blocks (127 and 128) claimed by Vietnam. China, however, appeared unconvinced and announced plans to expand maritime exploration of 10,000 sq km of seabed in Southwest Indian Ocean.

The afore-stated developments need to be seen in the context of India’s stated naval doctrine. The Indian Navy document (2007) “Freedom to use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy”, lays down clearly that India's area of interest which “extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea''. In the 2010 ARF meeting, India was among 12 (of 27 participating countries) that backed the United States’ multilateral approach, instead of China’s “bilateral approach” for resolution of the SCS disputes. During the 17th ARF meeting, India joined other countries to openly declare that the SCS should remain open for international navigation. The Indian position on the security situation in the SCS was made clear by the Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in her address at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on July 28, 2011, where she reiterated the region’s importance as an important shipping route and India support for freedom of navigation in sea-lanes.

India’s Interests in the SCS

India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the SCS. The SCS is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55% of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the SCS. Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to Mangalore through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region. If China continues to assert dominance over these waters, it will be difficult for India to continue with its activities through this channel.

India-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation

Maritime cooperation between India and ASEAN has been sparse and limited. Although Indian naval ships frequently visit the Southeast Asian countries ports and SCS, cooperation with regard to capacity-building and patrolling piracy-infested areas or jointly facing non-traditional threats at sea like drug-trafficking, human-trafficking and possible maritime terrorism remain inadequate.

India however, in recent years, has been seen as a credible counterweight to China. Southeast Asian countries, wary of continued Chinese aggression in the SCS, have encouraged joint maritime exercises with India. In February 2010, the Indian Navy concluded its Milan series of maritime exercises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and almost all ASEAN countries participated in Milan exercise.

India, which has helped Malaysia in building up its Coast Guard in the past, must consider assisting other ASEAN countries. India has a strong Navy with technological credibility that can be leveraged by ASEAN. Collaboration on missile technology, radar systems, defence component systems and supporting hardware are again areas where ASEAN countries can work in partnership with India. China, naturally, does not welcome the ASEAN move to interact militarily with India.

India has also shown keenness to sell Brahmos missiles to friendly countries including the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Most of the ASEAN countries have been engaged in a defence modernization programme and would like to obtain assistance in weapons up-gradation and systems integration. Like India, most of the Southeast Asian countries also rely on Russia for their defence procurements. India with its long experience in using Russian products and developed the technological capabilities for low cost servicing could be a potential ally for ASEAN in this field. Assisting ASEAN will also improve India’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries bilaterally and multilaterally and it will also boost India’s morale in balancing China in the IOR.

Conclusion

China’s recent acts in the SCS indicate that it is working on a ‘revisionist agenda’ in the region and trying to unilaterally change the status quo in the SCS. China’s rising economic and military might could compel the ASEAN countries to rally together as well as to seek assistance from the United States’ and other nations to balance China.

The US posture has, in turn, raised tensions in the region as China warned its neighbours not to “play with fire”. Further, Beijing believes that Washington is eyeing to control the Spratlys through Vietnam and the Philippines. If the territorial disputes relating to the SCS are not resolved soon to the satisfaction of all maritime stake holders including the littoral nations, a heightened global tension might result.

On India’s part, if New Delhi is concerned about the freedom of navigation in the SCS. It is only too aware that this is an issue that will profoundly impact Indian foreign policy. New Delhi realizes, now more than ever, that capacity building and maritime cooperation between India and ASEAN will be the key to stability in the region. However, the question arises, how will India sustain its position in the SCS, either through OVL or by backing Vietnam but this will require the political will and strategic vision.

*The views of the author(s) are their own, and do not in any way reflect or represent the opinions of SAEA GROUP, Singapore.

© Copyright 2011, Southeast Asia Research Programme by IPCS-SAEA GROUP

South China Sea Dispute: A New Area of Global Tension by Dr. Amit Singh

NMF Commentary

July 20, 2011

Varuna Complex, Airport Road,
NH - 8, New Delhi - 110010
Tel: +91-11-26154901
Tele fax: +91-11-26156520

Website:  www.maritimeindia.org

Published by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on July 20, 2011

Territorial disputes between China and several Southeast Asian countries, over islands in the South China Sea (SCS) have been going on for decades. However, with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) setting a deadline for submitting claims for extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles, the issue has turned into a new area of global tension. After Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their respective claims, China made a submission to the UN in May 2009 and claimed that it had “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” Beijing also included the SCS in its "core national interests" and in the non-negotiable territorial claims category—the same phrase it uses for Taiwan, Tibet and Xinxiang.

In response, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rejected China's claims to sovereignty over the 1.3 million square-mile sea at the 17^th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 at Hanoi. She stated that “the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea”, and reiterated the importance of “opposing the use of force or any coercion by any claimant.” Further, she called for a binding “regional code of conduct” in the South China Sea—a move that would undercut China’s attempts to assert its claims in a region that Beijing regards as “strategically sensitive”.

In the recent years, China has been growing increasingly assertive in pressing its claims over SCS matters. But the other nations in the region do not acquiesce to China’s claims. In fact, during the 2010 ARF meeting, it was reported that 12 of the 27 participating countries had backed the United States’ multilateral approach instead of China’s bilateral approach for resolution of the SCS disputes.

Claimants of the South China Sea

China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are the claimants of maritime zones in the SCS. In the South China Sea there are more than 200 tiny islands and several uninhabited rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs; majority of them located in the Paracel and Spratly Island chains. The Spratly and Paracel islands are the major flashpoints of overlapping territorial disputes within the South China Sea.

Table: Territorial claims relating to Paracel and Spratly Island Group

Country	Claims
China	Refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha islands, and claims all the islands and most of the South China Sea for historical reasons. These claims are not marked by coordinates or otherwise clearly defined. China also claims the Paracel Islands (referred to as the Xisha Islands), and includes them as part of its Hainan Island province.              Chinese claims are based on a number of historical events, including the naval expeditions to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming Dynasty from 1403-1433 AD. Chinese fishermen and merchants have worked in the region over time, and China is using archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of sovereignty.                In the 19th and early 20th centuries, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands. During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region. In 1974, China seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam.
Taiwan	Taiwan's claims are similar to those of China, and are based upon the same principles. As with China, Taiwan's claims are also not clearly defined. Occupies Pratas Island in the Spratlys.
Vietnam	Vietnamese claims are based on history and the continental shelf principle. Vietnam claims the entire Spratly Islands (Truong Sa in Vietnamese) as an offshore district of the province of Khanh Hoa. Vietnamese claims also cover an extensive area of the South China Sea, although they are not clearly defined. In addition, Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands (the Hoang Sa in Vietnamese), although they were seized by the Chinese in 1974.                The Vietnamese have followed the Chinese example of using archaeological evidence to bolster sovereignty claims.
Philippines	Its Spratly claims have clearly defined coordinates, based both upon the proximity principle as well as on the explorations of a Philippine explorer in 1956. In 1971, the Philippines officially claimed 8 islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan, partly on the basis of this exploration, arguing that the islands: 1) were not part of the Spratly Islands; and 2) had not belonged to anyone and were open to being claimed. In 1972, they were designated as part of Palawan Province, and have been occupied.
Malaysia	Its Spratly claims are based on the continental shelf principle, and have clearly defined coordinates. Malaysia has occupied 3 islands that it considers to be within its continental shelf. Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil from the mainland and has built a hotel.
Brunei	Does not occupy any of the islands, but claims part of the South China Sea nearest to it as a part of its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. Therefore, in 1984, Brunei declared its EEZ which included Louisa Reef.
Indonesia	Not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands. However, Chinese and Taiwanese claims in the South China Sea extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, including Indonesia's Natuna gas field.

Source: www.southchinasea.org

Map: South China Sea

Beijing claims almost the entire SCS, citing ‘historical’ records which purportedly show Chinese control in the region over the past two millennia. Taiwan’s claims are similar to those of China as the island considers itself to be the Republic of China. Indonesia is also a party to the dispute but they are seeking only maritime rights without claiming any islands of the region. In fact Indonesia’s EEZ and continental shelf overlap China’s claims, which include Indonesia’s largest natural gas reserves. Vietnam rejects China’s historical explanation and asserts that Beijing had never claimed sovereignty over the islands till the 1940s. Hanoi is convinced that both Spratly and Paracels are entirely within its own territory and has the documents to prove that the islands have been ruled by Vietnam since the 17th century.

Strategic and Economic Importance of the South China Sea

The main reason behind the scramble for the two island chains is its richness in natural resources, especially oil and gas. On April 19, 2011 China’s Global Times published a special report that termed the region as the “Second Persian Gulf” – a repository of 50 billion tons of crude oil and more than 20 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (about twenty five times China’s proven oil reserves and eight times its gas reserves).

The SCS is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Eighty per cent of China’s energy imports and Japan and Koreas oil supplies pass through these waters. Almost, fifty five per cent of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the SCS to China, Japan, Korea and the United States. The economic potential and geopolitical importance of the SCS are the primary motivating factors for the surrounding countries to claim the islands and their resources. The bountiful fishing opportunities within the region are yet another motivating factor for the overlapping territorial claims in the SCS.

Recent Upsurge in Tension

In the past few years, aggressive maneuvers of the PLA maritime agencies in the SCS have resulted in the ASEAN countries adopting a more robust defense policy. Vietnam is in the process of acquiring six Russian Kilo-class submarines and a dozen Su-30MKK jet fighters equipped for maritime warfare. Malaysia has also paid more than $1 billion for two diesel submarines from France. Indonesia too announced that it will acquire new submarines. Considering the strategic importance of the SCS, Australia has expressed willingness to buy or build nine more submarines and bolster its air force with 100 US-built F-35s.

As China seeks to intimidate her rivals into stopping oil exploration and mining in the area, other nations in turn have begun to protest vehemently against Beijing’s military build-up in the region. Recently, Vietnam blamed China for deliberately sabotaging two Vietnamese exploration operations which led to the huge anti-China protests in Hanoi. Consequently, Hanoi held live-fire exercises off its coast, an act described by China as a grave provocation.

These skirmishes run counter to the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (2002) in the SCS, drawn up between the ASEAN countries and the People’s Republic of China. Under the agreement, the countries had agreed to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations”. But recent developments have negated the ‘friendly tenor’ that underpinned the agreed mechanism for conflict resolution.

There is also news that China is planning to deploy her first aircraft carrier in the SCS on a trials basis. Beijing seems to believe that deploying the aircraft carrier will act as a deterrent to keep away the other nations eyeing the region. Beijing’s showing off tactics or deploying aircraft carrier close to the SCS can only add to the tensions and arms race in the region.

Conclusion

China’s recent acts in the SCS indicate that they are working on a ‘revisionist agenda’ in the region and trying to unilaterally change the status quo in the SCS. China’s rising economic and military might could compel the ASEAN countries to rally together as well as to seek assistance from the United States’ to balance China. As Beijing seeks to neutralize US presence in the region, the US appears to have become more assertive and keen to play a crucial role in the SCS dispute. In fact, the US has increased its maritime cooperation with regional countries, mainly concentrating on capacity-building with Vietnam and the Philippines. The US and the Philippines Navies held joint exercises in the SCS from June 28 to July 8, 2011. In an another move, the United States, Australia and Japan reportedly held a trilateral military exercise off the coast of Brunei in the SCS on July 9, 2011. These naval exercises do indicate the continuing US strategic stake in the region. In a joint press conference with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen on July 11, 2011 at Beijing, the China’s Chief of the General Staff, General Chen Bingde underscored that the joint military exercises held by US in the SCS with Vietnam and Philippines were “extremely inappropriate” and Washington should respect Beijing's core interests. On the contrary, Mike Mullen reiterated that the US would continue to support its allies in the region.

The US posture has, in turn, raised tensions in the region as China warned its neighbours not to “play with fire”. Further, Beijing believes that Washington is eyeing to control the Spratlys through Vietnam and the Philippines. If the territorial disputes relating to the SCS are not resolved soon to the satisfaction of all maritime stake holders including the littoral nations, heightened global tension might result. The forthcoming 18th ARF meeting to be held in Bali, Indonesia on 23 July 2011 could provide a useful opportunity to tone down the rhetoric and explore ways of reducing tensions in the SCS.

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